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ARE THERE MANY PHILOSOPHIES OR IS THERE JUST ‘DOING PHILOSOPHY’? 
Richard Sofatzis 
 
 
1. Introduction 
‘All men by nature desire to know.’ – Aristotle.1 
Aristotle’s famous declaration of the universal pursuit of knowledge attests to the truth 
that knowing, thinking and philosophising are capacities that all humans hold in common.2 But 
is the nature of this common pursuit one of unity or plurality: are there many philosophies or is 
there ‘just doing philosophy’? Can both of these propositions stand simultaneously, or does 
admitting one exclude the other? In this essay, I will initially outline that the term philosophy 
can be used in various senses: firstly, corresponding to the subjective act of philosophising and, 
secondly, to systems of thought which are judged against an objective criterion, reality itself. 
Then, by acknowledging that human thinking follows common principles, we will establish that 
true philosophy must form a unity. We conclude that there are many partially true philosophies, 
but only one authentic way doing of ‘doing philosophy’. ‘Doing philosophy’ proceeds from 
common and immutable principles and reflects the unity of truth itself. 
 
2. Philosophy: one term, multiple senses 
2.1 Conceptual analysis 
The meaning of the term philosophy is foundational in determining whether there are 
many philosophies or whether there is just ‘doing philosophy’. Philosophy, from the Greek 
φίλος (philos/love) and σοφία (sophia/wisdom), is often thus defined from its etymological 
roots as the love or pursuit of wisdom.3 Yet philosophy may also be considered as a system of 
                                                 
1 The opening sentence to Aristotle’s Metaphysics, as quoted/translated by McInerny, 11; Cf. Aristotle, 
Metaphysics, Volume I: Books 1-9, trans. Hugh Tredennick, Loeb Classical Library 271 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1933), 3, https://doi.org/10.4159/DLCL.aristotle-metaphysics.1933. 
2 Cf. McInerny, A Student’s Guide to Philosophy, 14–15. 
3 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Volume I: Books 1-9, 3–13. Here Aristotle speaks of man’s desire to know and the 
highest form of knowledge being wisdom. He then associates this with the term ‘philosopher’. According to 
Aquinas, Pythagoras was the first to call ‘himself a philosopher, i.e., a lover of wisdom.’ Thomas Aquinas, 
Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, trans. John Patrick Rowan, The Collected Works of St. Thomas 
Aquinas (Charlottesville, Va: InteLex Corporation, 1993), 24, 
http://pm.nlx.com.ipacez.nd.edu.au/xtf/view?docId=aquinas/aquinas.35.xml; Richard E. Creel, Thinking 
Philosophically: An Introduction to Critical Reflection and Rational Dialogue (Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishers, 2001), 15, 20–21, 35; Ralph M. McInerny, Thomism in an Age of Renewal (Notre Dame, Ill: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1968), 108. 
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thought, that is ‘a philosophy’ or ‘a philosophical theory’.4 While the first sense is implied by 
the phrase ‘just doing philosophy’, ‘there are many philosophies’ implies the second. I will 
argue that these positions are not necessarily contradictory, for one refers to a human 
action/practice, whereas the other refers to the result of the action/practice, namely the 
production of a system of thought. Therefore, the term ‘philosophy’ can be used in multiple 
senses, such that the two propositions of the question at hand should not be considered mutually 
exclusive without further clarification or qualification.  
 
2.1 Philosophy as a subjective activity 
Having established that there exist various senses of the term philosophy, it is now 
fitting to consider the reasons for this. Ralph McInerny points out that doing philosophy is a 
subjective activity, that is, it is an activity undertaken by a subject (a person) – let us designate 
this by the term philosophising.5 History irrefutably demonstrates that, just as many individuals 
philosophise, their philosophical thought is frequently incongruent with each another – whether 
partially or wholly.6 A multiplicity of philosophical theories abounds, and, by the second sense 
of philosophy discussed above, many philosophies.7 Therefore, reflecting on the propositions 
of our question in connection with the two senses of philosophy that have been developed, it is 
the case that while one can ‘just do philosophy’ in the pursuit of wisdom, on account of its 
inherent subjectivity, the result of history is that many people adhere to disparate philosophies. 
 
2.2 Philosophy as autonomous and objective 
Having considered the subjective nature of philosophising, we shall now examine that 
in another sense philosophy is ‘autonomous and objective’.8 At the outset of his Metaphysics, 
Aristotle identifies that philosophy seeks knowledge of ultimate causes and principles.9 Thomas 
                                                 
4 Frederick C. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. I: Greece and Rome (Westminster, Maryland: The 
Newman Press, 1946), 2–3; Etienne Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience (London: Sheed & Ward, 
1938), 307; Cf. McInerny, Thomism in an Age of Renewal, 111. 
5 McInerny, Thomism in an Age of Renewal, 107, 111; Cf. Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience, 325. 
6 Aristotle demonstrated this in his outline of the various prior theories regarding the causes of things. Cf. 
Aristotle, Metaphysics, Volume I: Books 1-9, 17–43; Similarly, cf. Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of 
Aristotle, 31–61; McInerny also demonstrates this with respect to the modern era of philosophy, cf. McInerny, A 
Student’s Guide to Philosophy, 8–9, 19-26. 
7 Cf. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, I: Greece and Rome:2–7; McInerny, A Student’s Guide to Philosophy, 
52. 
8 McInerny, Thomism in an Age of Renewal, 106. 
9 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Volume I: Books 1-9, 13; Jacques Maritain, An Introduction to Philosophy, trans. E. I 
Watkin (London: Sheed & Ward, 1930), 81.  
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Aquinas, commenting on a later passage of the same work, posits that ‘knowing attains its 
completion as a result of the likeness of the thing known existing in the knowing subject’,10  
and thus, we derive the criterion for all knowledge: reality.11 Therefore, since philosophy seeks 
knowledge, reality is equally the criterion for philosophy: all philosophical systems can be 
evaluated according to how well they are able strike the target of what is real.12 In a sentence, 
philosophy seeks not mere opinion but knowledge of the very way things are.13 And, thus, we 
are at the cusp of the conflict residing in our question: objective knowledge verses subjective 
thought. 
 
3. Uniting subjectivity and objectivity 
3.1 Universal principles 
In view of the tension between objective knowledge and subjective thought, it behoves 
us to first consider how the two might be compatible. The task of the philosopher, according to 
Etienne Gilson, is ‘to relate reality, as we know it, to the permanent principles in whose light 
all the changing problems of science, of ethics and of art have to be solved.’14 Indeed, human 
reasoning obeys fundamental laws, the immutable and common principles of reason: it is only 
through these that we can seek the truth: thought in accord with reality.15 We can infer from our 
previous discussion that human thinking is the requisite activity for him who loves and pursues 
wisdom,16 the result being his system of thought.17 On these grounds, there is only one way of 
doing philosophy: to adhere to the immutable and common principles of the human mind in the 
                                                 
10 Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, 481–82. 
11 McInerny, Thomism in an Age of Renewal, 106; Cf. John A. Creaven, ‘Personalism, Thomism and 
Epistemology’, The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review 8, no. 1 (1945): 8–12, 
https://doi.org/10.1353/tho.1945.0000. 
12 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. H. Rackman, Loeb Classical Library 73 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1926), 5, 325, https://doi.org/10.4159/DLCL.aristotle-nicomachean_ethics.1926. Aristotle’s 
analogy of hitting a target with respect to virtue in this sense similarly applies towards attainment of truth. For 
example, one aspect of reality or one point of view must not be stressed out of proportion with the rest of reality, 
less the arrow deviate from what is the true centre. 
13 Emmanuel Chapman, ‘Living Thomism’, The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review 4, no. 3 (1942): 369, 
https://doi.org/10.1353/tho.1942.0019. 
14 Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience, 324. 
15 In particular, the principle of non-contradiction expressed in its various forms. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Volume 
I: Books 1-9, 161–63, 169, 179; Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, 242, 248; McInerny, A 
Student’s Guide to Philosophy, 52; Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience, 320, 324; Peter Adamson, 
God Only Knows: Aristotle on Mind and God, History of Philosophy without Any Gaps, 2:45-3:45, accessed 15 
March 2018, https://www.historyofphilosophy.net/aristotle-mind-god. 
16 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Volume I: Books 1-9, 9; Maritain, An Introduction to Philosophy, xiii. 
17 As previously discussed. Here we refer only to Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience, 307. 
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search for truth. Thus, the common principles are the means of compatibility between subjective 
thought and objective knowledge – between doing philosophy and philosophy itself. 
 
3.2 The unity of true philosophy 
If doing philosophy is to use the common principles to seek out what is true, then what 
do these principles reveal about the truth of philosophical conclusions? Let us consider the 
principle of non-contradiction: it is ‘impossible for a thing both to be and not be at the same 
time’.18 More than simply a principle isolated to exterior reality or existence, this first principle 
also finds a consequent expression in the realm of subjective thought: truth claims cannot 
contradict each other unless, of course, one is false.19 Regarding other conflicts that seem to 
exist, deeper examination reveals these as merely apparent; real conflict cannot exist within the 
truth.20 Where there is truth, there is a consistency and harmony between the claims, not 
disagreement.21 This harmony is what Pope John Paul II calls ‘the unity of truth’.22 Therefore, 
philosophical thought that remains obedient to common principles has unity as its hallmark. 
Similarly, all philosophical thought that is true participates in a unity. Thus, while history shows 
there are many philosophical theories and systems, all philosophical thought that is true 
participates in a unity without contradiction. 
Having shown that true philosophy has the mark of unity, we will now consider whether 
this can be reconciled with the existence of diverse philosophical theories, each of which claims 
to possess the truth. A branch of philosophical thought, or even a whole system, may be only a 
partial and imperfect view of reality: in as far as humanity can add to, perfect and deepen its 
knowledge of the world, no philosophical effort holds the truth in all its fullness.23 In another 
respect, that philosophical theories disagree does not deny the possibility that a theory can 
                                                 
18 The First Principle of Demonstration (also known as the Principle of Non-Contradiction), following the 
wording of Aristotle in Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, 241–43, 793; Aristotle, 
Metaphysics, Volume I: Books 1-9, 161. 
19 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Volume I: Books 1-9, 199; cf. Paul Glenn J., An Introduction to Philosophy (St Louis, 
MO.: B. Herder Book Co., 1944), 19. 
20 Glenn, An Introduction to Philosophy, 19; J. M. Bochenski, Philosophy, An Introduction, trans. William 
Newell M. (Holland: D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1962), 44. 
21 Glenn, An Introduction to Philosophy, 19; Rudolf G. Bandas and J. S. Zybura, Contemporary Philosophy and 
Thomistic Principles (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing, 1932), 51. 
22 John Paul II, Fides et Ratio, Encyclical Letter (Vatican Website, September 14, 1998), sec. 34, 
http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_14091998_fides-et-ratio.html. 
23 John Paul II, sec. 4; cf. Glenn, An Introduction to Philosophy, 16–18; Aquinas, Commentary on the 
Metaphysics of Aristotle, 116: ‘no man can attain a complete knowledge of the truth’. 
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possess genuine truth about reality in some regard, albeit contain falsities in other areas.24 In a 
third respect, even a theory that errs with regards to its principles (and subsequently all 
conclusions drawn from these), nevertheless cannot exclude every element of truth – for every 
falsity contains some truth.25 On these grounds, every philosophical theory reflects the truth to 
some degree, albeit each in a distinct manner.  Therefore, there is a unity of true philosophy to 
be sought by synthesising what is true within the systems, which at the same time is open to 
further knowledge. Thus, referring back to our overarching question, there are indeed many 
partially true philosophies, each participating in a unity in so far as it is true.26 
 
3.3 The Thomistic synthesis 
As a case in point, a unity of true philosophy is precisely what Aquinas sought to 
achieve. Far from casting out, in totality, the thought of a philosopher that may have contained 
some error, Aquinas derived the truth from all who possessed it and built on it with his own 
unique contributions.27 J. S. Zybura describes Aquinas’ achievement as ‘a true philosophical 
synthesis’, that is, ‘a substantial union of established philosophical truth, not merely a 
mechanical juxtaposition of similar doctrines’.28 Aquinas’ achievement derives from his 
assiduous methodology of testing, purifying and developing truth claims according to reason 
and human experience, adhering to and guided by the common principles.29 Aquinas’ account 
is driven by the conviction that we experience the world through our senses in such a way that 
it is intelligible, and from this we can understand its order.30 Despite this assumption, it suffices 
to say that, whatever one takes as his convictions, true philosophy must obey fundamental laws 
of reasoning.  
 
                                                 
24 Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, 115. 
25 Glenn, An Introduction to Philosophy, 17.  
26 Here the phrase ‘partially true philosophy’ groups together the various senses of partial as elaborated: true but 
incomplete; true in some conclusions and false in others; false in all its conclusions. The third class may still be 
called partial on the grounds that every falsehood contains some truth, but to be clear, a half-truth is nevertheless 
a whole-falsehood.  Thus, I propose that this third sense only participates in a unity of truth analogously – as a 
spark towards the formulation of truth. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Volume I: Books 1-9, 85; Aquinas, 
Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, 119. 
27 Bandas and Zybura, Contemporary Philosophy and Thomistic Principles, 5–8. 
28 Bandas and Zybura, 7, 5–6. Zybura authored this section (the introduction) of the book. 
29 Bandas and Zybura, 5–6, 8. 
30 Bochenski, Philosophy, An Introduction, 36–37; Ralph M. McInerny, A First Glance at St. Thomas Aquinas 
(Notre Dame, Ill: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), ix. 
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3.4 Reality: the source of unity 
I would like to take the case study of Aquinas further to put forward, to the best of my 
understanding, a deeper argument for the unity of philosophy. As referred to above, Aquinas’ 
philosophy is based on the assumption that we experience the world through our senses in such 
a way that we have the ability to authentically know it through our concepts.31 The principle of 
identity, ‘a thing is what it is’, attests to Aristotle’s observation that reality shows itself to be 
composed of identities, that is, of individuals.32 For us to know anything of these individuals, 
they must, of themselves, be intelligible, having predicates/properties that distinguish them 
from other things.33  Aquinas also adheres to the principle of sufficient reason, namely, that 
everything has a cause that gives it order and existence.34 Since there cannot be an infinite 
regress of causes, lest there be no explanation at all, there must be a terminating cause, a first 
cause, that is responsible for the existence and ordering of every individual substance.35 On this 
basis, reality is a community of individuals which are unified and ordered by the first cause.36 
And hence, in so far as philosophy is about ascertaining the various truths of this united and 
ordered community, the resultant thoughts about it, if they are true, will likewise possess the 
order, unity and inter-relationship of reality itself. Thus, if we accept Aquinas’ assumptions, in 
addition to the argument of the unity of truth, another ground from which we argue for a 
synthesis of true philosophy is the unified ordering of reality. 
 
4. How to avoid ‘doing philosophy’ 
4.1 Simple adherence to a system 
Having established the clear possibility that subjective thought and objective reality can 
harmonise, we ought now to consider how a philosopher might put the two in opposition to 
                                                 
31 Bochenski, Philosophy, An Introduction, 36–37; McInerny, A First Glance at St. Thomas Aquinas, ix. 
32 Dennis Q. McInerny, Being Logical: A Guide to Good Thinking, Trade paperback ed (New York: Random 
House, 2005), 26; cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Volume I: Books 1-9, 161. 
33 Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, 216. 
34 McInerny, Being Logical, 27; Bandas and Zybura, Contemporary Philosophy and Thomistic Principles, 68–
69. 
35 Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, 908, 920–21, 925. 
36 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Volume II: Books 10-14, trans. Hugh Tredennick and G. Cyril Armstrong, Loeb 
Classical Library 287 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935), 123, 167–69, 173–75, 
https://doi.org/10.4159/DLCL.aristotle-metaphysics.1933; Aristotle, Physics, trans. P. H. Wicksteed and F. M. 
Cornford, Loeb Classical Library 228 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934), 23, 31, 
https://doi.org/10.4159/DLCL.aristotle-physics.1957; Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, 
854, 920, 925. Aquinas aptly puts it thus: ‘the whole universe is like one principality and one kingdom, and must 
therefore be governed by one ruler.’ 
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each other. In his explanation of why he is a Thomist, it may appear strikingly unusual that 
McInerny claims that ‘Thomas… was not a Thomist.’37 His justification is that ‘what [Thomas] 
was engaged in was not a kind of philosophy. [He] simply did philosophy.’38 Gilson explains 
that Thomas ‘had no system in the idealistic sense of the word,’ nor did he intend to ‘achieve a 
system of the world as if being could be deduced from thought.’39 Thus, adherence to a system 
of thought, whether it be any one of the many philosophical theories, is not in itself required to 
do philosophy – one may even blindly follow the mistakes of another by doing this. Rather, one 
adheres to a philosophical system in a secondary sense if it aligns with one’s own doing of 
philosophy. It can only be in this secondary sense, and insofar as he considers Thomas an 
exemplar for doing philosophy, that McInerny himself takes the label Thomist. With Aquinas 
as its embodiment, Thomism, then, gives our overarching question a practical answer: a 
Thomist ‘just does philosophy’, restrained not by any postulate of Aquinas (or of anyone else 
for that matter) but only by reality itself and the fundamental rules regarding how we must think 
about reality. 
 
4.2 Un-philosophical ‘philosophy’ 
While we have seen that blind adherence to a philosophical system fuels conflict 
between thought and reality, there is a fundamental basis behind the multiplicity of 
philosophical systems that people adhere to. Just as Aquinas argues that things ‘sometimes fail 
in their proper natural activity’, for which ‘order is lacking’, being subjected to ‘things which 
are contrary to their nature’, so too human reason itself fails in its proper activity when it 
deviates from the common principles of reality.40 Acting thus – against reason – is contrary to 
any concept of doing philosophy, yet in the history of philosophy, this is all too common, such 
that Gilson remarks, ‘What passed by its name was almost always something else’.41 Therefore, 
since we have previously demonstrated that doing philosophy proceeds from the common 
principles of reality in order to arrive at the truth, and not in the simple adherence to 
philosophical system disconnected from these principles, we further reiterate that nor does it 
                                                 
37 McInerny, A Student’s Guide to Philosophy, 51–52. 
38 McInerny, 52.  
39 Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience, 324, cf 308-9. 
40 Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, 921; Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience, 
321–23; McInerny, Being Logical, 29. 
41 Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience, 324–25; This is particularly true of many modern 
philosophers, cf. Mortimer J. Adler, Ten Philosophical Mistakes (New York; Macmillan, 1985), 198; Chapman, 
‘Living Thomism’, 374. A name may be transferred from the true to the false because of a superficial likeness; 
for example, pyrite or ‘fool’s gold’ is often mistakenly called gold. 
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consist in deviating from these principles – this is to act against reason: it is not doing 
philosophy! This wholly un-philosophical act is where the conflict between objective reality 
and subjective thought derives – with true philosophy there is no conflict. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Recapitulating our argumentation, we first saw that the term philosophy may be used in 
more than one sense to refer to both the subjective human activity of ‘doing philosophy’ and 
its result, namely the production of systems of thought – philosophical theories – which history 
demonstrates as many and various. Having concluded that there is only one way of doing 
philosophy, proceeding from the common principles of the human mind in the search for truth 
of what is real, we saw that the mark of true philosophy is unity. Since diverse theories can 
nevertheless possess the truth partially, a unity of true philosophy may be sought from what 
seems disparate: Aquinas embodies this effort towards synthesis, convinced that reality is 
unified and ordered. We set aside any notion that doing philosophy acts against reason or simply 
adheres to a system of thought, for this is to disconnect from these principles. Therefore, our 
conclusion is this: whilst there are various partially true philosophies, there is, properly 
speaking, only one overarching way of participating in a unity of true philosophy: obeying the 
fundamental laws of reason in search for the unifying and ordering truth about reality – and this 
is what we call ‘just doing philosophy’. ‘Just doing philosophy’ is what Thomism embodies, 
and it is on this basis that not only McInerny, but indeed this author also, calls himself a 
Thomist. 
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